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Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Newsletter – Indian Health Issue (May 1990)
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Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Newsletter – Indian Health Issue (May 1990)
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1.06-01.08 Union of BC Indian Chiefs Newsletter
1.06.-01 Newsletters and bulletins sub-series
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May 1990
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english
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1.06-01.08-01.02
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6
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Chief Saul Terry
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periodical
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UNION OF B.C. INDIAN CHIEFS NEWSLETTER #200 - 73 WATER STREET VANCOUVER, BC V6B 1Al Tel: (604) 684-0231 FAX: (604) 684-5726 May 1990 PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE: Indian Health Issue There are many political manipulations being played out in this country around the extinguishment of Aboriginal Title, Rights , and Treaties as we begin the 1990’s. This is not new, of course, but it means Indian Governments have to organize themselves to maintain the right to self-determination by whatever means necessary. The route to Indian self-government has had to shift gears from time to time but we have never given up our position on the Land Question. The Chiefs at the UBCIC 21st Annual General Assembly decided that the time had come to protect our Nations Aboriginal Title and Rights through a non-extinguishment treaty-making process. Something concrete had to be done to fight the Mulroney government’s on-going campaign to diminish the trust relationship with Indian people. So, the Chiefs directed the Union to help them develop non-extinguishment treaty-making as its focus for future work. A discussion paper titled The Aboriginal Right to Health, Treaty- Making And Indian Government Jurisdiction (copy attached) was presented to UBCIC Chiefs’ Council on April 30, 1990. This paper was developed to support the Union’s position that Canada has a trust obligation to the Indian Nations and that the Chiefs will not allow this trust to be diminished or broken. The UBCIC Chiefs’ Council firmly believes that the trust obligations of Canada go back even before treaties were signed and that Canada began abusing its obligations as soon as the ink was dry. Trust is the highest form of obligation between two parties. Today, Canada is continuing to try to distract Indian peoples from this vision. The Chiefs are concerned that policies like the Indian Health Transfer program have no safeguards, such as guaranteed financial resources and that Indian Bands will have difficulty carrying forward such devolution programs into the future. Most importantly, if Indian Bands accept these programs on the government’s terms only, the trust relationship will be diminished and our rights will be undermined. Therefore it is time to reflect and then plan our health programs more seriously and carefully. The devolution process initiated by the federal government has separated Indian Governments and Indian Philosophy from our peoples’ holistic health needs. This month’s newsletter provides a full copy of the UBCIC discussion paper for your information and deliberation. * * * SPARROW CASE: By Nancy Sandy, In-House Counsel, UBCIC SPARROW V. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in the Sparrow case on May 31, 1990. Mr. Sparrow (the appellant and a member of the Musqueam Band) had been charged with fishing with a drift net longer than permitted by the terms of the Band’s Indian food fishing license. The issue was whether Parliament’s power to regulate fishing is now limited by s.35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and whether the net length restriction in the license is inconsistent with s.35 (1). The decision required an analysis of 1) The meaning of the "existing" aboriginal rights and the content and scope of the Musqueam right to fish; and 2) The meaning of the “recognized and affirmed", and the impact of s.35 (1) on the regulatory power of parliament. The court held that the word "existing" makes it clear that the rights to which s.35 (1) applies are those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. Further, an existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. More importantly, the phrase "existing aboriginal rights" must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time. There was no dispute that there is an aboriginal right to fish, however, the Crown argued that the Musqueam Band’s aboriginal right to fish had been extinguished by regulations under the Fisheries Act. The extinguishment, the Crown argued, need not be express, but may take place where the sovereign authority is exercised in a manner "necessarily inconsistent" with the continued enjoyment of aboriginal rights. Consent was not required, extinguishment could be effected not only by statute but by valid regulations, and in this case the Fisheries Act and its regulations were intended to constitute a complete Code inconsistent with the continued existence of an aboriginal right. The court disagreed and said that the Crown’s arguments confused regulation with extinguishment and, although the right is controlled in great detail by the regulations, this didn’t mean that the right was extinguished. The court held that the test of extinguishment must be that the Sovereigns intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right. In addition, there is nothing in the Fisheries Act or its regulations that indicate a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Indian aboriginal right to fish. Thus the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving extinguishment. The appellant had argued that scope of the aboriginal right extended to commercial fishing. However, the court said that historical government policy is not only incapable of extinguishing the existing aboriginal right without clear intention, but is also incapable of, in itself, delineating that right. As well, the nature of governments regulations could not determine the content and scope of an existing aboriginal right. But, government policy can regulate the exercise of that right, and such regulation must be in keeping with s.35 (1). Since the case in the lower courts was not presented on the basis that the right extended to the right to fish for commercial or livelihood purposes the court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the right included not only the right to fish for subsistence, but also the right to fish for social and ceremonial activities, The focus then was still on the validity of a net length restriction affecting the appellant’s food fishing license and this meant an analysis of the meaning of "recognized and affirmed" and the impact of s.35 (1) on the regulatory power of Parliament. The appellant had argued that any continuing governmental power of regulation would have to be exceptional and strictly limited to regulation that is clearly not inconsistent with the protective and remedial purposes of s.35 (1). The onus of proving a justification for restrictive regulations would be with the government. The court in response reviewed the background of s.35 and concluded that s.35 (1) represented the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights. In effect, s.35 (1) provided a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent [land claims] negotiation could take place. It also provided constitutional protection against provincial legislative power and clarified issues regarding the enforcement of treaty rights. In interpreting s.35 (1) the court looked at general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to aboriginal rights and the purpose of s.35 (1). Applying these principles the court said that it is clear that a generous, liberal interpretation of s.35 (1) was demanded. In effect, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship. The court held that the protection afforded s.35 (1) did not mean any law or regulation affecting aboriginal rights would automatically be of no force or effect by operation of s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. For instance, legislation that affected aboriginal rights could still be effective if the interference could be justified. The power of the federal government to legislate against an aboriginal right must be read together with s.35 to determine whether the infringement is justified. Regulation must be enacted according to a valid objective and this gives a measure of control over government conduct and a strong check of legislative power. This means that the government bears the burden of justifying any legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right protected under s.35 (1) In setting out the test for interference with an existing aboriginal right and for the justification of such an interference the first question to be asked is whether the legislation in question has the effect of interfering with an existing aboriginal right. Furthermore, the court must keep in mind that fishing rights are not traditional property rights but are rights held by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and existence of that group when considering the following 1) is the limitation unreasonable? 2) does the regulation pose undue hardship? 3) does the regulation deny the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that right? Here, the onus of providing an infringement lies with the individual or group challenging the legislation. If there is interference, then is there a valid legislative objective? Here the court objected the Court of Appeal’s decision that regulations could be valid if reasonably justified as "necessary for the proper management and conservation of the resource or in the public interest" and said We find the "public interest" justification to be so vague as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the justification of a limitation on constitutional rights. If there is a valid legislative objective, then is the legislation justified? Here, the court held that it must be guided by the special trust relationship and the responsibility of the governments vis-a-vis aboriginals in determining whether the legislation can be justified. The court held that government policy with respect to the British Columbia fishery already dictated that, in allocating the right to take fish, Indian food fishing is to be given priority over the interests of other user grovps. Regulations must reflect that priority. The objective of this requirement was not to undermine Parliament’s ability and responsibility with respect to creating and administering overall conversation and management plans regarding the salmon fishery. Rather, the objective is to guarantee that those plans treat aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously. The Court concluded by saying that recognition and affixrmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the rights of aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and indeed all Canadians. Applying the above test to the case the appellant must show that the net length restriction constituted an infringement of the collective aboriginal right to fish for food. If there was an infringement, then the onus shifts to the Crown to demonstrate that the regulation is justified by showing that there is no unconstitutional objective such as shifting more of the fish to a user groups that ranks below the Musqueam and that the regulation is required to accomplish the limitation on the aboriginal right. The court ordered that the case go back to trial for a determination based on the principles outlined above. NOTE: The Sparrow Case will be covered in more detail in the June Newsletter. UBCIC 22nd ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY: The UBCIC 22nd Annual General Assembly will be held in Vancouver on October 23, 24, 25, 1990. Please keep note of this date and more information will follow. If you have any agenda items, resolutions please contact our office. STEIN VALLEY FESTIVAL: The Stein Festival is being held in Mt. Currie again this year. The dates are August 4, 5, 6, 1990. Featuring Gordon Lightfoot, Skywalk, Bill Henderson, Lytton and Mt. Currie Traditional Drummers, etc. Tickets: 3 day early bird - $35.00 WHILE THEY LAST through Ticketmaster. For more information call 669-3697 or 669-5697.
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